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Takeovers - will they 
ever be the same again?
by Philip Goldenberg
With the Company Law Review and the Human Rights Act, Philip 
Goldenberg, a senior corporate finance partner at City solicitors S J 
Berwin & Co, asks whether takeovers will ever be the same again. The 
answer, he says, is 'no'...
The Takeover Panel (the panel) is a remarkable institution. A voluntary unincorporated association exercising public functions, and indeed creating a 
system of quasi-law in competition with the general 
framework of company law. A body which originally 
claimed not to be amenable to judicial review, and in 
whose affairs the Courts, while rejecting this claim, have 
nevertheless hitherto been reluctant to interfere. An 
organisation which, given its voluntary nature, would be 
exposed to attack under art. 86 of the Treaty of Rome if it 
were to abuse its dominant position as a regulator; and 
yet, which, given the public functions it exercises, is 
subject to the obligations that arise in relation to public 
authorities under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998).
None of this, of course, is to decry the merits of the 
panel. Its rules are sensible, and indeed form the basis of 
the current draft EU Takeover Directive. Its operations 
are speedy and flexible; and its officials are helpful and 
courteous. But the House of Commons was on the side of 
historical inevitability when, in considering the Financial 
Services and Markets Bill, it allocated the ultimate control 
of market abuse in a takeover context not to the Panel, but 
to the statutory Financial Services Authority.
HUMAN RIGHTS
The HRA 1998 is relevant to the operations of the panel 
in two ways: the first general, the second specific.
The general issue arises under art. 6(1) of the 
'convention rights', which provides that, in the 
determination of their civil rights and obligations, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a 
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. It is probable (but not certain) that the 
panel (for this purpose including its internal appeals 
procedure) would be regarded as pronouncing a 
determinative judgment; but it is certain that the Panel is
not 'established by law'. Further, while it may well be 
'impartial', it is difficult, given its composition, to argue 
that it is 'independent'.
This leads to the point of specificity. The traditional 
rigid distinction between 'public' and 'private' equity 
(companies whose shares are publicly traded and those 
whose shares are not) is now unsustainable, as the 
multitude of 'public to private' transactions shows; and 
the composition of the panel is very much on the public 
equity side. How can it therefore be seen to be an 
'independent tribunal' in terms of art. 6?
A CHANGE IN ETHOS
Of great importance to the future of takeovers is a 
change in ethos which may be brought about by the 
Company Law Review. The process started in March 
1998, with the publication by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) of a consultative document called 
'Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy'. 
This established a review^ process which, while managed 
by the DTI, is nevertheless independent and self- 
standing.
There is a further relevant convention right as regardso o
takeovers. Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European 
Convention on Human Rights gives all natural or legalo o o
persons the entitlement to the peaceful enjoyment of their 
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the 
conditions provided for by law and the general principles 
of international law. There is a specific exception to this 
right (which might be better viewed as more specific 
wording in terms of the 'public interest exception') in 
relation to the State's right to control the use of property 
in accordance with the general interest.
This exception would presumably cover a compulsory 
purchase order (CPO) made in accordance with and for a 25
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purpose provided in statute law (although the Courts would 
clearly be open to argument that a particular CPO was 
inappropriate in terms of the applicable convention right). 
But the exception would not seem to apply to an 
expropriation ot property other than for a public or general 
interest purpose. As is well-known, under the takeover 
provisions of the Companies Act 1985, an offerer obtaining 
more than 90 per cent of an offeree's shares may then 
expropriate the minority, subject only to the right of a 
dissenter to apply to the Court. There have not been many 
such applications, and the general wisdom has hitherto been 
that the Court would be reluctant to intervene (simply on 
the basis that, if over 90 per cent of shareholders have found 
an offer acceptable, why shouldn't everybody else). The 
application of art. 1 to the First Protocol, however, opens up 
the argument that dissenter minority shareholders could 
simply say that thev wished to retain their shareholdings,
I J J J O '
and there was no public or general (as opposed to private) 
interest in favour of such shareholdings being expropriated. 
What view the Court would take, in terms of the balance 
between the dissenter's convention rights and a 'general
o o
interest' argument in favour of the traditional application of 
the present law, has yet to be ascertained. There is no doubt, 
though, that the balance has been tilted by the HRA 1998.
A CHANGE OF ETHOS
Of great importance to the future of takeovers is a 
change in ethos which may be brought about by the 
Company Law Review. The process started in March 
1998, with the publication by the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) of a consultative document called 
'Modern Company Law for a Competitive Lconomy'. This 
established a review process which, while managed by the 
DTI, is nevertheless independent and self-standing.
A year later, the steering group of the review process 
published a strategic framework consultative document 
setting out the key issues as it perceived them, particularly 
the general framework of corporate governance. Various 
technical consultation papers followed.
In March 2000, the steering group published a much 
lengthier document called 'Developing the Framework'. 
While this was still in some senses consultative, it was 
nevertheless firmer on those issues already aired a year 
previously. So heavy (in all senses) is the document that it 
is known to cynical professionals as the 'Green Brick'!
One of the key proposals of 'Developing the Framework' 
is that listed companies should be obliged to publish 
annually an Operating and Financial Review (OFR), which 
would go beyond the traditional form of historic financial 
reporting to a much more broadly-based set of indicators.
An OFR would include:
  a developmental review of a company's business, 
including market changes, new products and services, 
and changes in market positioning;
  a company's purpose, strategy and principal drivers of 
performance;
  its key relationships with employees, customers, 
suppliers and others on which its success depends;
  a review of its corporate governance;
  the dynamics of a company's business, including a full 
SWOT analysis, which would go beyond the financial toJ ' o J
market conditions, technological change, health and
7 O O '
safety, environmental exposure, tangible and intellectual 
capital, brand development, research and development, 
and training;
  environmental policies and performance; and
  policies and performance on community, social and 
ethical issues and reputation.
It may be argued that any competent management would 
do all this anyway; but the effect of this change will be to 
compel less good management to improve their standards, 
and also to introduce a real measure ot transparency.
SPECIFIC PROPOSAL
There is a specific related proposal in 'Developing the 
Framework' whose significance has so far been under- 
appreciated. In the event of a takeover bid, a revised OFR 
will need to be published; in the case of a recommended 
offer, this will presumably be a single OFR relating to the 
proposed enlarged group. This will significantly change 
the culture of takeovers, because offerors will no longer be 
able to get away with anodyne statements; for example, 
thev will have to be much more specific about earningsJ T
enhancement or dilution.
The proposal will have a much greater impact on hostile 
takeovers. At the moment, the conventional wisdom is that 
the board of an offeree company which does not welcome 
a bid should limit its response to the fairness or otherwise 
of the consideration offered. Indeed, in some prominent 
cases, financial or legal advisers have cowed offeree boards 
into not robustly defending a bid on non-financial grounds.
For example, the directors of BOC could have chosen to 
contest the proposed takeover by Air Products. The eventual 
decision by the US competition authorities demonstrated 
after the event that there were good grounds for resisting the 
bid. Yet the board felt obliged to take the advice of lawyers 
who claimed that it was their duty to shareholders to 
recommend the bid. Likewise, the directors of Manchester 
United were advised that they were obliged to recommend 
without reservation the BSkyB bid for the Club. They (or at 
least some of them, including Mr Greg Dyke), would have 
preferred to warn of the undesirability of a football club 
becoming the cat's paw of a multinational media enterprise.
CONFLICT
Here is the point of conflict. The City Code on Takeovers 
and Mergers obligates directors of offeree companies to
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pronounce on the fairness and reasonableness (or 
otherwise) of a hostile bid. That is too often misinterpreted 
as being the totality of their duties in such a situation, and
o J '
misstated as being such by financial and/or legal advisers.
o J o
The prospective new Companies Act will include a 
restatement of directors' duties   not by way of alteration, 
but by way of clarification and accessibility. These duties will 
make clear that directors are not obliged to think only of the 
short-term financial gains to shareholders when taking 
major decisions about the future. It should be perfectly 
legitimate for directors of an offeree company to say:
'This is a reasonable price. But the consequences of selling to 
this bidder at this price will be undesirable and we recommend 
against selling.'
Their reasons may include the impact upon the industry, 
its customers, its employees, its community or its tuture 
potential.
The shareholders can then decide whether or not to take 
this view into account. But neither the law, nor its 
interpretation by professionals, should drive directors to 
abdicate responsibility to financial or legal advisers, and 
claim that they are legally obliged to recommend a bid 
even if they think it will be bad for the company.
CRUCIAL
This is why the proposed OFR is crucial in the case of a 
hostile bid. The offerer and offeree will be bound to 
prepare separate OFRs, the offerer on the assumption of 
the bid's success and the offeree, if it resolves to oppose 
the bid, on the assumption of its failure. This process will 
at the very least force the directors of the offeror and 
offeree companies to set out their resultant plans and 
analyse their potential implications for customers, 
suppliers and employees, as well as for shareholders and 
the wider community. The result will, at the very least, be 
a more informed decision at the end of a more thorough 
process of examination.
I do not intend to argue against a market in corporate 
control, subject only to an appropriate framework of anti- 
trust legislation. But such a market works best on the basis 
of transparency. @
Philip Goldenberg
Senior Corporate finance Partner, 5 J Bemin 8^ Co
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